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Abstract 
 
Trade in services and its positive relation with countries’ development has been a consideration in the design 
of public policies. In particular, since the return of democracy, it has been pointed out by Chilean authorities 
the intention to improve services exports to add value and diversify its basket. Since the first decade of the 
2000 the State has implemented a series of programs and strategies directed to achieve these objectives. 
However, the matrix remains anchored in natural resources, particularly copper. Although trade in services 
has increased, it has not done so as expected. In order to understand the reasons why public policies intend to 
promote the service sector have failed achieving their objective, this work has interviewed experts from the 
public, private and academic sector, international organizations and NGOs to collect their perception on 
policies to promote services exports implemented in the period 1990 – 2014. For a better understanding of the 
results, three overlapping levels are distinguished, in a logical hierarchy from greater to lesser extent: Level I: 
Considerations on economic doctrines and corporate cultures. Level II: Considerations on the specificity of 
service industry and economic considerations. Level III: Considerations on specific policies and instruments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Chile is a country renowned for its trade openness and high economic integration to the world. It is also very 
well studied case for its substantial reliance on cooper and other natural resources exports. This has been a key 
issue for the different governments, no matter the ruling political party, for which they had establish various 
strategies and policies to transform the export and productive matrices into services. With the consideration 
that services could be one way to reach a higher degree of development.  
 
The effects of exports over economic development are closely related to their value-added content. This 
means that products with superior quality and more innovation incorporated will have better results in 
economies. Those countries that have managed to diversify and add value have done so through programs that 
contains public policies; this is, with State intervention. 
 
The importance of the services sector in economic development has increased in the last decades, with a 
progressive strengthening of its weight in economic activity and employment generation. There is increasing 
evidence that the activities with the highest added value are those that allow more development and services, 
according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), generate two-thirds of the globally value added. The 
increasing integration of markets and the emergence of new tradable services, as a result of technological 
changes and new forms of production, have led countries to identify more complex services as a way to 
develop and diversify their productive and export baskets. 
 
Meanwhile, the composition of Chilean exports remains anchored on the exploitation of natural resources with 
low added value. This concentration has been a concern in all administrations since the return to democracy. 
The presidential speeches of the first governments, which reaffirmed the strategy of openness, aimed at 
reorienting it towards an improvement in the quality of exports and it was not until the first government of 
President Bachelet (2006-2010) when it was recognized the need for industrial policies, and the improvement 
of the productive structure and export to achieve development and overcome the inequity problem. 
 
There is consensus in the academic, public and private worlds that the diversification of the export basket, 
especially oriented to qualified services, is essential, both to reach the goals or expectations of national 
development, and to achieve the consequent improvement in the living conditions that such development 
would enable. In this sense, the role of the State through the implementation of general strategies of economic 
development is fundamental and has been so in those countries that have reached higher levels of 
development. Despite of the above, in Chile the results obtained account for an insufficiency or poor quality 
of public policies implemented. 
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The article focuses on carrying out, together with the literature review, a series of interviews, to identify the 
ideological and academic discussions that exist in relation to the convenience of the State intervention for the 
economic development or, on the contrary, the limits that it is considered to have. In other words, the 
arguments those defends or refuse to have a State that acts by prioritizing or promoting the export of services. 
 
In Chile some export promotion policies have been implemented in a punctual way however the real situation 
is that the matrixes are still highly primary concentrated. Exports of services have grown but not in the 
expected and necessary amount to modify the Chilean situation. The objective of this article is to capture the 
perception of key actors in the public, academic and private sectors regarding their opinion of the results of 
the different attempts to increase services exports and create a solid new export sector in the period 1990 -
2014. Understand the tension between the manifested intention of diversifying the economy and the 
persistence of an export basket primarily based. 
 
The interviews were conducted to key informants form public, academic and private sectors, including 
international organizations and non-governmental organization. The selection used as main criteria the 
relation between the interviewed and the services sector. The sample is biased to public sector mainly to 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Treasury.   
 
In the first section we will review the literature that sustains the positive relation between trade in services and 
development. In the second, the different programs implemented in Chile will be mentioned. Then the results 
of the interviews will be presented and finally some conclusions. 
 
TRADE IN SERVICES AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Trade in services and development is still a difficult to probe causal relation, the absence of a strong 
theoretical corpus is compensated with a high degree of agreement and empirical evidence that value added by 
some services in exports boost growth which is a precondition for development (Adlung, 2007; Coll-Hurtado 
& Córdoba y Ordóñez, 2006; Mattoo, Rathindran, & Subramanian, 2006; UNCTAD, 2010b, 2016; World 
Bank, 2010). Theory accords no special role to services activities in growth, with the exception of financial 
services (Hoekman & Mattoo, 2008a; King & Levine, 1993). There are some stylized facts that support this 
positive relation like that develop countries services export participation is higher than those of developing 
countries; and that countries have shown to be more resilient to crisis when they are services oriented.  
 
This absence of theory is also reflected in the insufficient empirical research on how trade in services are 
relevant for an economy and which policies support the emergence of dynamic and efficient tradable services 
sectors (Hoekman, 2017). It is more common to find literature about the role of services as the backbone of an 
economy and the role they have to overcome poverty (Barngrover, 1963; Eschenbach & Hoekman, 2006; 
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Hoekman & Mattoo, 2008b; Riddle, 1986). CEPAL (2012) explained the consistency of studies correlating 
countries’ income level with the preponderance of the service sector in the economy. Services are identified as 
the pillar of growth while open services markets have become the underpinning for global growth (Kenneth, 
2006; UNCTAD, 2010a).  
 
Trade in services matter for growth and development in different ways. Trade liberalization is a fundamental 
channel for improving services performance (Borchert, Gootiiz, Grover, & Mattoo, 2015; Cali, 2008). With 
the increasing tradability of services due to the technological changes allowing more services to be traded 
cross-border more research has been develop (Hoekman, Mattoo, & Sapir, 2007; Mattoo & Payton, 2007; 
Mattoo & Sauvé, 2003). According to WTO (2010), the benefits of trade liberalization could be divided in a 
domestic and an international dimension. The first one is that liberalization improves the domestic services 
market, attract investment, which enhances services, and increase competition, which theoretically improves 
innovation. Nevertheless, these results depend on how liberalization is executed. The international dimension 
states that having a better domestic services market increase the probability of export both services and 
manufactures. Robinson, Wang, and Martin (2002) considered that service sector trade liberalization not only 
directly affects world service production and trade, but also have significant implications for other sectors. 
Konan and Maskus (2006) determine that services liberalization increase economic activity in all sectors, raise 
the real returns of capital and labour and generate large welfare gains. 
 
The more conclusive studies are those for financial services. For example Francois and Schuknecht (1999) in 
a cross country growth regressions found a high correlation between financial sector openness and the 
increase in sector competition, and then a relationship between growth and financial sector competition. 
Hoekman and Mattoo (2008b) explore the role of services in economic growth, focusing in particular on 
channels through which openness to trade in services may increase productivity. They mainly conclude that 
financial services can affect growth through enhanced capital accumulation or technical innovation. They also 
conclude that low cost and high quality telecommunications will generate benefits. Francois, Van Meijl, and 
Van Tongeren (2005) established that opening foreign bank entry does improve access to financial services, 
improve banking sector efficiency and promote economic growth directly and indirectly. 
 
Literature also deals with the effect of openness in services on economic growth for countries at different 
stages of economic development (Bhagwati, 1984a, 1984b; Wölfl, 2005). Francois and Reinert (1996) point 
out that value added originating in services is positively linked to the level of per capita income. Regarding 
developing countries, Cattaneo (2010) in an individual analysis for different sectors found the positive effect 
between trade in services and develop. A. López, Niembro, and Ramos (2012) analyse the insertion 
possibilities of Latin-American countries and the advantages form opening. El Khoury and Savvides (2006) 
measure the influence of services liberalization in developing countries and found a relationship between 
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openness in telecommunication services and growth for countries with income per capita below an 
endogenously determined threshold level and no evidence of a significant relationship for countries above it.  
 
There is an increasing amount of literature that measures trade in services impact on growth subject to the 
pattern of comparative advantage in producing manufactures and services (Hogan, Keesing, Singer, & 
Mundial, 1991). Hogan et al. (1991) have empirically studied the relations of trade or trade in services 
liberalization and their effect in manufacturing. Deardorff (2001) points out that trade liberalization in services 
can yield benefits, by facilitating trade in goods that are larger than one might expect from analysis of the 
services trade alone, and can also stimulate fragmentation of production of both goods and services. Arnold, 
Javorcik, and Mattoo (2006) conclude that services policy matters for manufacturing performance and that 
there is a strong correlation between services sector reform and productivity of local producers relying on 
services as intermediate inputs. Deardorff and Stern (2008) explained that opening services sectors to foreign 
providers is a fundamental channel through which services reforms affect downstream productivity in 
manufacturing.  
 
The positive effects in labour force services have and the effect over development is another relevant route of 
research (Bosworth & Triplett, 2004; Browning & Singelmann, 1978; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2011b; Hansda, 
2001; Riddle, 1986). Services is one of the most important labour force origin and will be each day more 
relevantly in the global value chains (Miroudot & Shepherd, 2016; UNCTAD, 2016). The low mechanization 
of services is one of the reasons of the increasing labour force in this sector (Soubbotina, 2004). 
 
Some country`s cases are emblematic for understanding the links between services and development as India 
(Banga, 2005; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2011a; Hansda, 2001; Singh, 2006), United States (Alejandro et al., 
2010; Bosworth & Triplett, 2004), Singapore (Anwar & Sam, 2008; Yue, 2005), amongst others. Empirical 
literature mainly those of the cases of south Asia have given a turn to Latin American research, mainly 
because we were some decades ago in very similar conditions of non-diversified export baskets and most of 
Asian countries reverted this situation which is not the regions actuality (Arriagada, 2007; Coll-Hurtado & 
Córdoba y Ordóñez, 2006; A. López et al., 2012; A. López, Ramos, & Torre, 2009; Luna, 1989; F. Prieto, 
2004; F. Prieto, Sáez, & Goswami, 2011). 
 
Trade in services and its liberalization matters for growth, a requirement for development. This positive 
relation is dependent on how the implementation of opening markets is performed and also the benefits are in 
direct association with the level of development of each country. Trade openness improves the domestic 
services sectors and its possibilities of increasing exports. That also has a positive effect over manufactures 
and improves labour. Trade in services is a key issue in the global value chain (GVC) structures and in adding 
value to exports, which are the real challenges for the region of Latin America, a region with highly 
concentrated export and production baskets. Telecommunications and transport particularly are identified as 
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essential element of the GVC that have increased in the last years. The liberalization of these services is to 
open new trade opportunities for all the world firms to improve the world development. 
 
The next questions that we try to deal with is how we can improve the trade on services, and which is the new 
role of the State in promoting services in Latin America, mainly the case of Chile. This in a context of more 
competitiveness of participation in GVC, where the process of relocation and fragmentation of production of 
goods has moved to services and global offshoring in recent years has had significant growth (Direcon, 2015; 
Muñoz et al., 2014). 
 
SERVICES EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES 
 
Policies and institutions, and their interaction, may explain in some aspects the dissimilarities in countries´ 
services sector performance. There is an increasing literature analysing the role of export promotion policies 
and services trade development (Cali, Ellis, & Williem, 2008; Mattoo & Payton, 2007; OCDE, 2005; World 
Bank, 2010). The existence of a positive relation has a diverse degree of consensus with a high agreement that 
some kind of promotion policies are needed to boost or to create trade services exports in different sectors. As 
A. López et al. (2012) argue, public policies play a fundamental role at the moment when a country wants to 
attract investments and export services.  
 
During the second half of the XX century exports promotion emerged as a fundamental element in any 
economic development strategy. Nowadays, most of the States have export promotion institutions (EPI) 
working against the market failures and supporting economic insertion of their countries (Lederman, 
Olarreaga, & Payton, 2009; Seringhaus & Botschen, 1991). There are less studies regarding services export 
promotion policies, and particularly in Latin-American countries compared to those on goods (Cali et al., 
2008; F. Prieto, 2003). 
 
The non-traditional exports promotion emerges as a particularly appropriate field for trade selective policies. 
Without an active promotion in these sectors exports tend to be concentrated in few firms and in products with 
less dynamic demand. A central idea is that export promotion policies require not just liberalization or 
macroeconomic stability; they should be directed to exporters to help them to overcome the sectorial barriers 
and to have a fast reaction to price or other signals (Agosin & Basch, 1997). The capacity to export services is 
determined by the interplay of endowments, institutions and infrastructure. 
 
Regarding trade in services a series of arguments could be acknowledged to justify the State interventions 
additionally to those identified for goods. First, owing to the nature of services, they are characterized by 
elements of natural monopoly, high barriers to entry and asymmetries of information. Second, they are subject 
not to easily identified tariffs, they are subject to regulations, norms and laws form other States. In third place, 
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the higher complexity in selling intangibles implies also more difficult for exporters in getting to other 
markets. As we see the multimodality of transactions a characteristic of services creates different and more 
barriers to trade, than those in goods.  
 
To have a strategy in services demands to link institutions and instruments with the design of scenarios of 
short and long term that allows creating competitive advantages more than use the existing ones (Cali et al., 
2008; F. Prieto, 1991) states that these policies should: a) create a level playing field and enable competition 
between market players; b) warranty the quality of the services provided; c) protect consumers and guaranty 
transparency; d) protect the environment; and e) guaranty access to services. 
 
There are some barriers to services exports that governments must overcome: a) services are not goods, most 
of the knowledge in how to improve export sectors has been develop to goods, many times the problem is that 
policy makers just try to replicate these strategies in services (Francois & Hoekman, 2010); b) the absence of 
an international agreed definition is a recurrent problem and the absence of trustable statics does not help to 
design these policies (D. López & Muñoz, 2016); c) the unknown aspect of barriers, in services barriers are 
more difficult to identify; there are no tariffs as in goods, there are domestic regulations, norms, etc. 
(Hoekman & Mattoo, 2008b). Recently there has been developed a services restrictions index that could be 
very useful (Service Trade Restrictions Index - STRI); d) identify those export potential sectors, how to get to 
services producers that need support to export, and not to aim to less sectors or with low association levels (F. 
Prieto, 2000). Finally, the dynamic changing nature of the sector and its necessities, are increasingly, more 
complex than they were ten years ago. 
 
The most common trade in services promotion instruments used had been: Trade openness and trade 
agreements; Support to market exploration and commercial intelligence; Information spreading; Improving 
capabilities; Cluster; Associativity; Subsidies; Tax and regulatory support; Mechanism of finance; Exchange 
rate policies; and Policies for investment attraction. The export promotion State entities are essential for the 
insertion of a country in global value chains GVC and in adding value to its exports through services. Services 
have characteristics that made them more susceptible for this kind of support. Latin American still has a lot of 
space to become a services exports region. Chile has explained his intention to become an important services 
export economy. ProChile is the main export promotion agency and has a services department; also CORFO is 
directed to services, in the next section this and the different instruments will be revised. 
 
CHILEAN STRATEGIES FOR TRADE ON SERVICES PROMOTION 
 
One of the main problems in Chile regarding diversification is the unsolved discussion between selectivity and 
neutrality of economic policy. This is also a common disagreement in academic literature. For some authors, 
intervention in certain sectors in developing countries is absolutely justified due to information and 
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coordination problems (Volpe, Carballo, & Gallo, 2011). Countries also have to choose between promotion 
policies due to budget limitations. Most of Chilean economic policies have followed a neutrality approach, 
despite its high dependency on natural resources exports, and that since more than 30 years ago the political 
discourse claims that we have to diversify, identifying services as a way for achieving this objective.  
 
On an institutional basis, trade in services promotion has been based mainly in two Ministries: Foreign Affairs 
and Economy. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, first DIRECON (Dirección General de Relaciones 
Económicas Internacionales) created in 1979, which is responsible for international economic relations and 
trade negotiation has a specialized department on services, investment and transport. Second, ProChile, 
created in 1974, the export promotion agency that since 2004 has a services department. At the Ministry of 
Economics is CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción), established in 1939 with the objective to 
enhance national productive activity oriented to create industrial capacity. For many years concerned with 
traditional sectors, services appeared with the clusters Programme during the first President Bachelet 
government. In the last years, other institutions related to services have also started to get involved in facilitate 
trade in services. Particularly, at the Treasury Ministry, the customs service (Servicio Nacional de Aduana), 
the internal revenue service (Servicios de Impuestos Internos) and the foreign investment attraction office 
(before Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras, today Agencia de Promoción de la Inversión Extranjera or 
InvestChile,) have begun to get awareness of the importance of services exports. 
 
Below we present the main policies implemented in Chile towards services promotion in the last years. We 
must take into consideration, as stated above, that for the most years, a neutrality approach was in place, 
leaving selective policies aside, until the implementation of the clusters program during the first Bachelet 
government.  
 
Trade Openness  
In the context of a neutral economic policy, Chilean governments worked to set up the conditions for the 
development of all industries, including services, allowing them to compete both at the domestic and 
international markets. Therefore, trade openness becomes sort of the base of economic policy. As Chile is a 
small economy, opening and guaranteeing access to new markets was the main objective in the decades of 
1990 and 2000.  
 
Services become part of this strategies, particularly after their inclusion in the GATT`s Uruguay Round, and 
the establishment of the WTO GATS in 1995. Chile placed horizontal limitations on commercial presence and 
movement of natural persons on its list. The specific commitments undertaken by Chile under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) cover 5 of the 12 service groups defined in the Sectorial 
Classification List of Services: business services, communications services, Financial services, tourism 
services and travel related services, and transport services. Chile only assumed commitments related to the 
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auxiliary services of air transport in the last item. As this was the first negotiation regarding services, 
commitments made by Chile are less than their actual openness, and it is possible to affirm that the country 
offers better entrance conditions than those consecrated in the lists.  
 
The main advances made in services negotiations have been in Chilean preferential agreements. In 1996, after 
the failure of NAFTA because of the United States government's inability to obtain approval of a Fast Track 
by its congress, Chile opens itself to negotiate bilaterally with Canada in what would be the first Free Trade 
Agreement, and the first time services were included in a bilateral negotiation. After this agreement, the 
inclusion of the services in the work agendas at the time of starting each new negotiation becomes an 
important condition for Chile. In general, the service chapters contain commitments in three of the four modes 
of provision, as mode 3 is confined to specific chapters of foreign investment or bilateral agreements in these 
areas. 
  
Out of the 26 Chile`s trade agreements in force today (annex I), 18 contain provisions related to trade in 
services. Chile negotiated with the modality of positive list the chapters of services contained in the 
agreements with the European Union, with EFTA, Hong Kong, China and Mercosur. In the latter cases, the 
issue was dealt with in supplementary agreements. The rest of the agreements that include services (including 
the United States, Canada and Mexico) were negotiated following the negative list NAFTA model. According 
to estimates made in the WTO, through its preferential trade agreements Chile has commitments in more than 
85% of the service sectors in mode 3 and more than 75% in mode 1 (Roy, 2011). Chile is also part of the 
ongoing TiSA negotiation, the trade in services agreement negotiated aside WTO. For Chile, this negotiation 
is important due to the participation of economies with which we do not have chapters of services in force; 
substantial improvements in offers from partners with which we already have FTAs in force, such as the EU; 
agreement with new or improved disciplines and broad sector coverage, including matters of particular 
interest to Chile, such as temporary entry of service providers, professional services, electronic commerce and 
services related to air transportation; and due to Chile`s will to play a leading role in the design of the rules 
that will govern world trade in services over the coming decades, as it is an agreement that aims to be 
multilateralized and involving economies that account for 70% of global trade in services, including important 
partners Chile, such as the US, the EU and 5 other Latin American countries (DIRECON, 2017). 
 
In order to complement trade agreements markets access, Chile has also signed Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreements (IPPAs, Annex II) and Double Taxation Agreements (DTAS, Annex III). IPPAs were 
signed as a way to attract FDI, by securing conditions and delivering legal certainty to foreign investors at a 
time when the country needed the inflow of capital. But the development of the national economy, and in 
particular of some economic sectors, has led Chile today to use these agreements as a way to protect its 
investments, particularly in other South American countries. Annex II presents a list of IPPAs subscribed by 
Chile that are in force at the date of this work. DTAs were signed with the aim of facilitating the establishment 
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of companies in the country and allowing national firms to set up branches and representations in third 
countries. The double taxation agreements are international legal instruments signed between two states, 
which are incorporated into the domestic legal system of each of them and whose purpose is to eliminate or 
reduce double international taxation that affects or hinders the exchange of goods and services and Capital 
movements, technologies and persons, benefiting exclusively the natural or legal persons resident or 
domiciled in one of the contracting States.  
 
Sectoral Brands 
This program originates with the objective of supporting the Chilean productive sectors through the 
international positioning of sectorial brands, representative of national productive sectors and that contribute 
to the image of Chile abroad. According to E. Prieto (2013), the incorporation of Sectorial Brands into 
ProChile since 2011 has made it possible to order and strengthen state support for the internationalization of 
companies and productive sectors, by taking advantage of the institution's experience in promotional matters 
of exports, knowledge of the markets and its wide international network. This program is planned for one year 
and must be renewed annually. ProChile undertakes to co-finance up to 60% of annual activities with no 
ceiling. The idea is that when a sector "already has its sectorial brand, they can continue with the work done 
by postulating an implementation project, as it seeks to give continuity to existing brands, in order to 
consolidate brands in time, and not Lose the efforts and the initial investment made " (E. Prieto, 2013). Since 
the inception of the program, 19 sectoral brands have been created, based on both goods and services. The 
sectorial brands focused on the export of services include gastronomic, architecture, biotechnology, education, 
cinema, engineering, information technology, manufacturing; mining suppliers and tourism (annex III). 
 
CORFO has different programs, not only oriented to services.
4
 These programs are mainly directed to 
overcome financial problems, and the development of new industrial areas, amongst its programs that could 
be used by services providers, we may acknowledge:  
 On competitive creation:  
o NODOS: export promotion platform;  
o FOCAL: quality improvement program;  
o PROFO: associative development program; 
o PDP: program for suppliers development;  
o PFC: a program for competitiveness capacitation;  
 On innovation:  
o IFI: support projects on technological investment;  
o PDT: technological diffusion program;  
o CATAPULT(A): on technological innovation, business and validation;  
                                                        
4
 A full description may be found in their web page www.corfo.cl. 
12 
 On entrepreneurs support:  
o Scale up; co-financing and support of dynamic business; 
o COBEX, trade coverage; 
o FOGAIN: investment and working capital guarantee;  
o PROINVESTMENT, on investment coverage.  
Additionally, some tax exceptions for services had been implemented such as value added tax (VAT) 
exemption for those services supplied by foreigners not living in Chile that the Customs Service classifies as 
services exports, and to those received by tourism hotels in foreign currency. A stamps tax exemption is also 
considered for documents oriented to finance credit operations for exports (Law No 3475). Article 36 of the 
Decree Law No. 825 of 1974 provides that exporters are entitled to recover the VAT they have been charged 
when buying goods or using services for their export activity. They have the same right regarding the tax paid 
when importing goods for the same object. The recovery of VAT occurs, either by charging directly to the tax 
debts that originate from operations within the country, or by requesting its return. A series of measures to 
facilitate the reimbursement of value added tax and capital goods imports, through online platforms (SIF-M 
system) have been implemented.  
 
Global services cluster 
In 2006, at the beginning of Michelle Bachelet's presidential term, the National Innovation Council for 
Competitiveness (CNIC) defined the National Innovation Strategy for competitiveness, with a view to 
doubling GDP per capita by 2020. In the framework of this Strategy, and based on the diagnosis made by the 
international consulting firm Boston Consulting Group in 2007 and the recommendations arising from its 
"Cluster Competitiveness Study of the Chilean Economy", five clusters are defined by the sectors with the 
greatest potential for growth in the medium and Long term: food, mining, special interest tourism, aquaculture 
and offshoring (Boston Consulting Group, 2007). At the end of 2007, the clusters are implemented, through 
the formation of strategic councils, the election of executive secretaries and the elaboration of specific 
agendas. During 2011, under the administration of President Sebastián Piñera, CORFO defines non-selectivity 
as a management criterion and reformulates the cluster program, in order to support private sector initiatives 
in a neutral way. It is recognized that markets are dynamic and therefore public policies must adapt to the 
circumstances (CORFO, 2012). 
 
In order to evaluate the results of the policies implemented towards the promotion of the services export 
industry, the following section presents the results of interviews conducted with key stakeholder, in order to 
analyse their perception regarding this topic. 
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RESULTS: KEY STAKEHOLDERS PERCEPTIONS  
 
This section presents the results of the research on why development-oriented policies in Chile's exporting 
services sector did not achieve the expected results. Through the identification of the reasons perceived by the 
key stakeholders related to services and promotion policy. They  have a diagnosis of what happened during 
the process from their different spheres and participated in different ways in defining what was done or not. 
They were classified for reporting purposes according to their most relevant job in services. Three main 
categories were defined: public sector (A), private sector (B) and other stakeholders (C); due to confidentiality 
clauses, interviewees will be identified according to these categories. From the 49 interviews, 24 are from the 
public sector, 11 were ministers in different governments (Foreign Affairs, Treasury, Economy and 
Agriculture) or vice-presidents of CORFO or directors of ProChile; they will be identified for reporting 
purposes with an A1. Then, 13 are directors or department responsible from DIRECON, CORFO, Treasury 
Ministry, Customs and Agriculture, identified as A2. The second category, private sector, includes 6 actors 
form individual firms (B1) and 5 representatives from private associations or business chambers (B2). Finally, 
14 belong to academy, NGOs and international organizations, they were identified C. The sample has a bias 
towards the public sector and mainly to the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy and Treasury. This was 
because the question sought to understand why more aggressive strategies were not designed, used or 
considered from different administrations, since there was a deep awareness that the lack of complexity in the 
country's export and production baskets was insufficient to achieve better jobs, greater equity and improve 
individuals’ life quality.  
 
In general, they start from the initial premise that confirms an absence of a state policy to promote services. 
They show consensus that there was no policy to promote the export of services, beyond specific initiatives, at 
least until the first government of President Bachelet. Likewise, they consider that the current productive 
export matrix - intensive in copper and agroindustry with low added value, and not in services - is the result of 
a lack of consistency, resources and will. In this direction, it can be said that another explanation of this 
insufficient development was the absence of many factors, mentioned in this section, and of such depth that it 
made it very difficult to try to achieve such an ambitious goal. In this way, the question operates as an 
analysing element of the vision of the economic development experts regarding the corporate, institutional and 
even cultural ideological supports of our society. More than talking about a failure, it is a clear awareness of 
the impossibility of meeting a goal such as that proposed for the services sector. 
 
For a better understanding of the results, three overlapping levels are distinguished, in a logical hierarchy from 
greater to lesser extent: 
Level I: Considerations on economic doctrines and corporate cultures. 
Level II: Considerations on the specificity of service industry and economic considerations. 
Level III: Considerations on specific policies and instruments. 
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Below, an in depth analysis of these levels is presented. 
 
Level I: economic doctrines and corporate cultures 
 
On this level the first order determinants in our research have been grouped together and identified by the 
relevant actors, which are the economic doctrines adopted in Chile and its business groups. In all the 
interviews these first order elements present an important explanatory load.  
 
The consensus answer was that there has been an absence of policies that could modify in a significant way 
the Chilean export structure into services. They acknowledged that at least until the first Bachelet government 
there were only punctual initiatives to promote services. Interviewees indicated that the latter is a consequence 
of the neoliberal model´s high permeation into Chilean society. With the concept of subsidiary State deeply 
incrusted in all the governments. This implies the agreement on the non-State intervention in economic 
aspects. “The State subsidiarity was very clear, and it was fundamental to sustain it for the market well 
operation” (A1). The model generated an institutional and a thinking structure that defined the policy making 
in productive development. As one interviewee pointed out, "the model penetrated so much that it convinced 
policymakers that neutrality was best. It not only generated a political class, but companies also preferred this 
scheme of neutrality" (B2). Other acknowledged that "what the market cannot solve is difficult to think that an 
intervention could achieve, since in general it deepen the distortion" (A1). It is recognized that there has been 
a fear of using expressions such as 'industrial policy', not to mention 'planning'. 
 
The principle of neutrality marked the policy of productive development in a definitive way, and economic 
textbooks indicated that the danger of choosing the winners outweighed the benefits of doing so, therefore the 
productive development policy to implement was to give the market the conditions to function as close to 
perfect competition. As one stakeholder mentioned "neoliberalism punctured any policy of incentive in any 
sector" (A2). There was a high agreement amongst them that neutrality was the approach that defined the 
approximation of the State to the productive sphere. In what they differed, and more like a posture in the light 
of results, is whether or not this position was correct. What was repeated is that the absence of strategy was 
indeed the strategy: "there was no national productive strategy, much less to look at services in a formal way" 
(C), or that, in fact, "there were more relevant priorities than to industrialize the country and less to support 
services" (B2). 
 
Thus, the model becomes a kind of internal law due in large part to the desire for peace and governance 
present at a particular moment in recent history. That is, this model replied to a specific need for stability that 
would allow the peaceful democratic transition. One interviewee mentioned that "the rest of the region had 
emerged from dictatorships with severe problems of hyperinflation and economic disorder. We had to 
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demonstrate that we were capable of giving governance without a military government in command" (C). And 
while there were dissenting voices about how the model should be implemented, finally "we were attached to 
the neoliberal model, because we had to ensure governance, and for that, every economic strategy should be 
international" (A1). Some believed that the conditions for the model were determined by external and existing 
factors and that "the model implanted by the Chicago boys
5
 would have arrived even without them" (C), or 
that "it was the model demanded by conditions prevailing in the country in the 70s and did not depend on the 
government on duty" (A1). The model, according to this view, "had worked and had damaged those 
companies or interests that could rebel against its imposition, so it was not very difficult to think that was the 
way to go" (C). That is, those who had already endured privatization, openness and change under the 
dictatorship were not going to oppose, and those who might have opposed had not resisted previous reforms. 
 
The other problem with the model is that by eliminating any type of planning attempt and leaving everything 
to market forces, a problem was repeated in many countries of Latin America: a short-term vision in the 
government's action. As one of the stakeholders mentioned "the general view of the region is short-term. This 
was radicalized before the neoliberal model and is notorious, for example, in the change that Chile did 
modifying the presidential periods to four years. This makes impossible to achieve processes of greater 
magnitude" (A2). Another added that "the problem is that services, innovation or simply trying to add value 
necessarily imply a vision of investing now to collect later, and this is outside the type of society we have 
moulded" (C). 
 
For some experts there has to be a shift towards a more active horizontal policy in the direction of selectivity: 
"not to return to industrial policy has to do with a fearful society, a conservative business and a State reduced 
to a minimum. Chileans stopped being entrepreneur and if it does not recover it, we will not develop" (C). 
 
The other determinant of the first order refers to business community, entitled in this context to assume the 
complex initiative of organizing the production processes of exportable services. There is a conception that 
Chilean business class did not have the necessary characteristics to assume such responsibility. The existing 
entrepreneurial culture was restricted for reasons of cultural and historical class formation, in neo-rentier 
forms, by climate, latitude and even by geology. We have, what we can name, an elite that is different from 
the Asians; traditionally rentiers and landowners. The particular feature of Chile is that they are small elites, 
isolated and used to agree amongst them. In the case of the rentier element, "it would respond to the presence 
of factors associated with a society that lives off the exploitation of its natural resources and does not develop 
capitalism" (C). The military coup replaced these elites with transnational capital that did not obtain its gain 
from work or from the added value that labour produces, but from the income of the wealth of natural 
resources, from the land. Therefore, they did have not incentives to innovate and create wealth.  
                                                        
5
 “Chicago boys” is the name used to refer to the economic team of the Pinochet regime, due to their academic 
preparation in the University of Chicago, US. 
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On the contrary, the development of an export services sector requires highly trained entrepreneurs in the 
logic of complex management of productive advantages not necessarily associated with natural factors. Some 
views that defended the model argued that "entrepreneurs are called rentiers only because they like to earn 
money. And if they do it by exploiting natural resources and nobody regulates or prohibits them, why should 
they make efforts in another direction?" (A1). In addition, they pointed out that "they are more committed 
towards work, because they do not profit from the State. Look what happened with import substitution model" 
(A1). 
 
Meanwhile, from the institutions of the State responsible for the services sector they considered that to the 
extent of their restrictions, they have reacted permanently to the demands placed by the business sector. But, 
they pointed out that in services there is a serious problem in the ability of entrepreneurs to associate, because 
of their heterogeneity and size: "the government tells them to identify their necessities and they are not 
capable to get organized" (A1). The problem of associativity is very deep in this sector. From the point of 
view of one of the respondents: "in a demand response scheme, those who can export are very large or 
exceptions, such as the Sonda
6
 case" (B1). 
 
Level II: specificity of service industry and economic considerations 
 
In this level, we have identified considerations associated with the specificity of services sector, their 
conditions and how these are exacerbated due to some Chilean characteristics. Specifically, economic 
considerations are analysed as a result of the design of the economic model and the consequences it has had. 
The understanding of decision makers on important aspects of services sector and their potential was 
identified to be insufficient or null. It is possible to indicate that this unfamiliarity was explained as a 
consequence of the following aspects, developed below: i) the recent irruption of the services in the 
commercial world; ii) coexistence in a designed and structured world for goods; and iii) the difficulty of 
measuring them and the meagre efforts made in this direction. 
 
The possibility of exporting services as part of a development strategy appears in the region relatively late. 
Moreover, according to one interviewee, Chile was quite "pioneer in considering them as a development 
option" (B2). Services comprehension intention came in the 1990s, while for "goods there was absolute clarity 
of what could be done" (B2). Another interviewee added that "in the 1990s there was only awareness that 
there are services and that they can be traded" (B1). Services trade promotion came very late. For example, in 
the framework of promotion policies: "ProChile just created a service department in 2004" (A1). And it was 
                                                        
6
 Sonda is one of the biggest ICT Chilean companies, with presence in most of the Latin American markets. 
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established with "a low budget and at the request of a small group and due to the requirement of international 
commitments" (A2). 
 
In contrast, there was an increasingly developed view that we cannot speak of a broad service sector and that 
individualizing them is essential: "services are difficult to understand and in turn are very heterogeneous. 
They put all the services together and that does not how it should be" (B2). Interviewees recognized services 
as a heterogeneous sector, but in spite of this there is no evidence of an intention to institutionally divide their 
promotion or support. Nominally there is in ProChile a Services Department, but in contrast with goods, this 
department has to work with the heterogonous service sector as a whole. As one interviewee said, "it is a 
much dispersed sector, so it is difficult to have an objective, and all efforts are concentrated in small 
departments" (A2). 
 
Definitely it is complicated to understand services in a world of goods. The reason might be that "policies 
have always been designed for goods and copied for services, which does not work" (A1). It is more 
understandable a transaction in goods and to generate the policies around it, but to approach services is a more 
complex task: "For example, regarding taxes, how to tax a service? It is still very complex, because you have 
the logic of goods. In the case of tax returns, there is the need to enable customs to understand what is being 
discussed and to proceed with tax refunds" (A1). This happens in most areas, where "excessive orientation to 
goods as a result of the large endowments with which Chile has historically counted has tarnished the 
development of services" (B1). 
 
In a model whose logic of operation and design of public policies is based on indicators such as efficiency and 
accounting results, it is hard to incorporate a sector that has not been statistically weighted: "a first problem 
that is detected with the development of the services sector are problems in registering them, which would 
account for a first great difficulty" (A1). There are no statistics, even at the global level, except for some 
efforts by the WTO and the OECD, "but they will of course depend on national efforts as well" (A2). For this 
reason, it is complex to make public policy without statistics in the framework of a model such as the Chilean, 
which operates with indicators logic, "it is impossible to convince the ministers to do something if you do not 
explain the profitability and less to the Parliament, not to mention the Treasury" (A2). Also, this becomes a 
problem for the private sector, where associativity is fundamental: "how do we make our partners understand 
that we have to submit numbers to the authorities to help us, or vice versa? We have asked the Central Bank 
many times for support, but it has no interest" (B2). In this respect the role of the Central Bank as collector of 
data is questioned, beyond those that can handle other public services. In particular, it is criticized not to have 
made an effort to include new items in the balance of payments to have statistics on the sector. But, "it is 
something involuntary that they do not support services. Because they do not know what it is, it is very 
difficult to get into. On the other hand, goods are very simple" (C). Nevertheless, there have been some 
attempts, "small strategies to develop statistics, but it is probably necessary to get rid of this marked trend of 
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indicators and to design support programs in areas that are considered potential based on other, less 
quantitative criteria" (C). 
 
It is interesting to highlight the responses of services exporters or those companies that have not been able to 
export. They pointed out that their problems are linked to two institutions: National Customs Service (SNA) 
and Internal Revenue Service (SII), which depend of the Treasury Ministry. Despite this critical look, these 
interviewees argued that "there are customs problems that are not their responsibility to solve, but to Treasury. 
Finally, the interests of the SII prevail before the SNA and as there is not enough lobby, they are allowed to 
protect certain attributes" (B2). When consulted on this subject both the Treasury and the National Customs 
Service responded that these dependencies only operate within the framework of a law and, in addition, do not 
have sufficient resources to train and inform their operators or users: "we cannot facilitate more than we have 
done. The law allows us to only make the tax exemption on mode 2” (A2). The size of the State is also a 
limitation: "we do not have enough personnel, but it is clear that if it is a priority project of interest for the 
country, we would have to dispose of them" (A1). 
 
The model has created its own actors, that is to say, a public sector that has lack of creativity and that is not 
able to establish those areas in which it wants to innovate. As already mentioned it responds permanently to 
demands and does not venture into the creation of projects. It has not identified them, perhaps for fear of 
choosing the winners and going against the theory. As one interviewee said, "we are full of barriers to 
entrepreneurship. The government does not make changes, like stamp taxes. I'm not even suggesting deeper 
changes" (C). Again, State´s neutrality has not demanded professionals thinking about the generation of value 
added, since "the model has created a political class that does not consider industrial policy" (C). It seems that 
"Chile is a country of improvisation and little politics" (C). 
  
The size of the Chilean State was not considered adequate for the implementation of any type of industrial 
policy and, more complex, the evaluation and monitoring thereof. The model has had the clear objective of 
diminishing the role of the State, whose size and forms of participation are inferior to that of any developed 
country: "public companies were eliminated and concessions were granted. There could be a larger State, but 
with the same conviction it would not do either" (C). The objective of this process has been "to dismantle the 
State. That is why Corfo’s status was lowered" (A1). 
 
In addition, for some interviewees Chile is in a complex region regarding the level of trade openness of the 
country, because where Chilean exports have greater added value are precisely its neighbours: "natural 
commerce is with whom you share links, history, distance, even colonial ties, so the natural destiny is South 
America, obviously" (C). This is reinforced by the fact that "SME entrepreneurs cannot go very far, at least at 
an early stage. It would be logical to go to the countries of the Southern Cone, but the region is very bad as a 
natural destination" (B2). In the private sector there was a negative perception about trading partners, as in the 
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case of Argentina, although they are recognized as attractive markets, they are considered to have conditions 
that make it impossible to invest in them. 
 
In another point, regarding human capital English proficiency had been identified by all diagnoses as essential 
in the service export process: "we need skilled manpower and we do not speak English. There is a shortage of 
human capital. With better labour we could create new sectors" (A2). This diagnosis was widely accepted, 
even among the sectors with the necessary labour force: "how are we going to be service providers, if we do 
not have the qualification to be one" (B2). In some sectors this has a greater impact. For example, "in tourism 
we have no possibility without trained human capital" (A2). In addition, there is no determination of what the 
country needs in the creation of skills, because "vocational training of technical staff is very important in the 
development of a country. We not only need professions with advanced academic degrees" (A1). 
 
Another great issue that the interviewees perceived was that in Chile there is lack of confidence amongst 
society. This creates a crisis in associativity and reduces collaboration, which is very detrimental to growth 
and development. One stake holder mentioned that, "we are not able to believe in the other" (C). The Legatum 
Prosperity Index is an indicator developed by the Legatum Institute and considers 110 countries in 2014, 
according to a variety of factors, including wealth, economic growth, personal well-being and quality of life. 
The conclusion: "collaboration, a fundamental aspect in value aggregation, is at a deficient level in Chile" 
(Marshalll & Rodríguez, 2010). 
 
In their perception, the process of Chile's trade insertion in the world and its prominent role as part of the 
economic policy strategy could not by itself modify the export basket, but it was expected. Treaties rarely 
appeared in the interviewees' opinion as an aspect to be addressed, although most FTAs subscribed by Chile 
have some reference to services, and in no case were identified as a useful exporting instrument. One of them 
expressed that "the policy of agreements would be the main one, and the sectoral policies, driven mainly from 
Corfo, more limited, to link public private partnership" (B2). 
  
However, overvaluing trade policy in a country's economic policy may lead to neglecting the internal aspects 
of this insertion: "trade agreements have not had a sufficiently relevant effect, apart from the opening of 
markets and double taxation" (B2). And the worst thing is that this conception has disqualified the design of 
other policies, because "the agreements served in many aspects, especially they gave Chile a kind of 
international certification as a reliable country. What we must now do is move on to a second stage" (A1). 
 
Public-private partnerships in Chile were not perceived to be developed, and although "there are some 
initiatives, they are small. There are no such cases of success as was the one of the salmon, for example" (C). 
It is possible to mention some experiences in the services sector, such as the case of architects, engineers or 
even some timely export in areas of information technologies, but they do not yet have characteristics that 
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allow them to be sustainable and successful. Alliances are strengthened within the framework of a subsidiary 
State model, under a new relationship in which the private sector and the public sector pursue common goals 
and share the risks. However, it is difficult to conceive of these alliances without some apprehensions, such as 
the private co-opting the State, or companies committing real resources and risk jointly: "entrepreneurs in 
Chile always want the capital to be risked by the State" (B2). 
 
The economic aspect has been a priority and has defined most of the State strategies, with a focus primarily on 
the market and a subsidiary State, which has manifested itself in several of the structural issues that have been 
revised. That is, "in Chile the economic world has been privileged over the political, which from a technical 
view has been positive" (A2). As for the budget for the programs, another interviewee stresses that "if an idea 
does not have the support in money, it does not work. The issue is because there are other (social) spending 
priorities" (C). The relevance attributed to some ministries is evidence of the weight of the economic view: 
"the power of Treasury is an indicator that the patterns that define policies are economic" (A2). Thus, 
economic policy decisions have been centralized in the Treasury Ministry, reducing the force to ministries like 
Economic, which are somehow called upon to do industrial policy: "the supremacy of the Treasury Ministry 
against a country project is of high consensus" (A1). 
 
The financial system, despite being a service, does not seem to understand or be willing to support service 
companies. Services sector to its international insertion needs the financial provision: "there is no access to 
risk capital. The financial had not developed a logic to work with services, which have no capital, so there is 
no access to financing" (C). In some cases it was possible to move forward without pretending major changes: 
"the credit sector has been full of regulations, but none to promote competition" (B2). 
 
 Other problem perceived is that in order for the market model to work, it is necessary to have competition: 
"the level of collusion is evident in many sectors, not only in pharmacies. The difference is that there are those 
who suggest giving greater power to the National Economic Prosecutor, including jail sentences" (A1). 
Although competition policy in Chile they clarified is modern compared to the rest of the region, it is 
insufficient. The fault is obvious, as one expert exposed: "retail is known to use internet platforms for price 
matching and it is not possible by law to prove collusion" (B2). Competition is essential in the world of 
services, because the margins are small and they are intensive in human capital, in particular to be an SME to 
survive. 
 
The exchange rate was identified as a very relevant factor and they highlighted that there had been given little 
attention to it, not only in terms of services. There is little awareness that the exchange rate reduces 
competitiveness: "there is a kind of obsession for inflation and excessive Central Bank´s power in it. It has 
had strong consequences on the composition of the export basket and as long as this is not understood, it is 
impossible to think of a change" (C). The model was very severe in establishing that the exchange rate should 
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not be transformed into a productive policy, but clearly it is an instrument that has devastated the export 
basket and its composition: "moreover, if we review its evolution, it has not succeeded in helping non-
traditional exports emergence. For services competitiveness is essential to address this issue" (C). In other 
words, it will never be possible to diversify if we are unable to control the exchange rate problem with 
coherent strategies. 
 
The pre-eminence of taxes for services export was highlighted as more important than for goods. As noted 
previously, services are human resource intensive and their earnings depend on income from the payment of 
human resources. Therefore, when exporters have to pay taxes in both countries it is impossible for them to 
trade in this sector. This issue is directly related to the problem of ignorance regarding its nature and lack of 
statistics. Understanding of barriers is very scarce and taxes are identified as a very relevant one. There have 
been very general ideas, such as creating investment platforms, but the real problem is that "in Chile the 
service export industry is affected by local taxes" (C). In some cases double taxation agreements were 
reached, but they have not been sufficient. In other cases, users do not know their scope or existence, and 
there seems to be no incentive to disseminate these agreements: "given the lack of knowledge of the services, 
the SII performs its functions strictly and this discourages companies" (B2). 
 
 
Level III: specific policies and instruments 
 
Finally, at this level, a number of policy considerations and specific instruments and sectors related to services 
are addressed. The interviewees pointed out that there were some initiatives for the design of programs 
towards the services sector development, but they emphasized that they clearly did not correspond to a project 
of greater complexity or even "for each of the subsectors. They were the response to specific needs or 
individual ideas and budgets" (C). In addition, "there is little money and there is an important dispersion of 
efforts" (A2). Moreover, there were no vertical policies and "there was never a policy aimed at specific 
companies that selected winners, but rather more inquisitive cases" (A1). 
  
Although it was possible to perceive an intention in many civil servants who had clarity on the potential of the 
sector, no changes were made, even in aspects that were sometimes minimal: "there are few or no strategies in 
the modification of norms or regulations that will help to advance in the conversion. The speeches have not 
been translated into regulatory changes and much less economic" (B2). 
 
At this level, a number of policies and instruments are analysed. In the process of this research the 
interviewees were consulted regarding the evaluations that they had on the programs implemented. Neither the 
private sector nor the public had structures to evaluate these programs, not only as a consequence of the short 
term measures, but also because of lack of instruments and priorities: "they are such a small amounts, badly 
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distributed, that no one evaluates them, for what" (A1). As an example, one stakeholder explained that 
CORFO failed to evaluate a program that was as relevant as the global services cluster. The program was 
discontinued and funds were redirected. Although there was a possibility of renewing this policy, "the cluster 
had not been evaluated and that is fundamental to justify its return" (A1). 
 
In all the interviews, references were made to ProChile and CORFO as the entities most closely linked to 
diversification and service-oriented policies. Opinions were divergent, but they have in common to describe 
them as institutions with little functionality and with few resources, which support as much as possible, but 
not in a relevant manner. Furthermore, the multiplicity of institutions oriented to the promotion and support of 
services exports that do not have any kind of institutionalized coordination becomes an obstacle to the 
implementation of the support itself. For example, "there is no link between ProChile and CORFO. It is more 
about a personal relationship than a process of coordination. There is a great disarticulation of institutions like 
CORFO, ProChile and Sercotec" (A1). They mentioned that there is something similar in the private sector, 
because "those who make policies do not coordinate, nor do we the chambers on more obvious issues" (B2), 
and there is an uneven or duplicate distribution of resources. In general, it seems that you have to be close to 
CORFO, which have more funds, but the truth is that it operates heavily as isolated units. In the responses of 
the interviewees was clear that the personal relationship and links over ranked institutional communication. 
  
The lack of coordination, the diffuse role of different institutions on the same subject and the lack of success 
of the implemented programs revealed that there has never been an agent "sufficiently empowered to make 
policies in this direction" (B2). Service companies are primarily smaller, human-capital-intensive firms, this 
means that unlike the goods sector -where there are strong incentives and possibilities for partnership- there 
was no leadership or partnerships with which to dialogue: "not only is there a lack of leadership among the 
diversity of public institutions; in the private sector as well" (B2).  
 
Regarding ProChile, in some civil servants we found a negative perception of the institution, which was seen 
as an inoperative entity, with a very marked orientation to goods and has a limited budget and receives little 
attention. The private sector has a better perception, but always individually, for the support received, but not 
thinking something will drastically changes its situation. 
 
For a long time ProChile has reacted mainly to a demand logic and not to country strategy policies. It creates 
programs and allocates budget depending on the requests of the guilds or associations: "the Department of 
Services does not have the time, or an area that analyses the possibilities of development of any sector. In fact, 
we have sections and these have already relation with the sectors" (A2). Also, the budget for services is very 
low: "to a lesser extent, the promotion policies would be within ProChile (Sectorial brands), where services 
are not a priority, for example, the budgetary differences with the forestry and livestock sector: they receive 
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ten times more" (A2). This is something to have in mind when you contrast ProChile performance and their 
scarce resources. 
 
Coordination and liaison with CORFO and other agencies that have similar objectives involve matters of a 
non-institutional nature: "personal relationships are what make strategies more than cooperation between 
institutions through established formal channels" (A2). We found in the interviews consensus on the little 
coordination between the entities and no institutional structure that forces these synergies to occur. One 
stakeholder explained that in part they respond to the interests of each organization, but fundamentally 
attributes it to a coordination problem. A successful outcome depends very much on the type of leadership of 
each institution at a specific time, which responds to a personal. An example was the null contact between 
ProChile and CORFO during President Piñera government, due to conflict of styles between those who were 
running them: "there was never as little contact between CORFO and ProChile as during this government" 
(A2). 
 
Regarding CORFO, it was distinguished as more relevant than ProChile in terms of budgetary advantages for 
the programs in services. Thy perceived it as an institution with independence and resources, but strongly 
influenced by the economic model, and that also underwent through an important process of dismantling. 
Although CORFO has more budget than ProChile, their programs are very directed to goods although it 
"would be the institution that could be successful in some diversifying policy. It has more weight than the 
other" (C). 
 
Finally, respondents were particularly asked about the reasons why the global service cluster did not function. 
As we mentioned, it meant a turning point in the policy of neutrality that emerged in the first administration of 
President Bachelet, which was the result of a job commissioned to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)
7
. In 
some cases, the stakeholders' responses showed that the problem refers only to the suspension of funds 
directed to the program. However, they recognized that the structure of the policy allowed it to be dismantled 
so easily: "it is necessary to think with more long term perspective the policies in productive matters, since the 
effects are only long term" (A2). So it cannot be thought that in a framework of four-year presidential periods, 
certain policies continue to be pursued, which also require significant amounts of resources. As one 
interviewee summarized, "with respect to the cluster initiative, they are long-term processes that should have 
been allowed to mature, as was trade policy" (C). There are more critical expressions, which consider that "the 
cluster failed because there was no clarity about what was wanted to propose. The cluster failed because what 
was raised to attract high technology actually attracted cheap labour rather than modern services" (A1), or 
that" the cluster failed because there was not enough long-term vision," (A1).  
 
                                                        
7
 The government commissioned the Boston Consulting Group to develop a study identifying potential areas to boost 
growth. 
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Through the interviews the stakeholder expressed voluntarily some recommendations for a future services 
export promotion policy that we will present in the next section with the conclusions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research carried out an analysis of the role of the State in the planning and orientation of development 
strategies for the sector of exportable services in Chile, in order to understand the relation and the tensions 
derived from the dichotomy between the manifested aspiration to diversify the export production and the 
subsistence of a little diversified basket based on raw materials with low added value. In the first section we 
attempted to demonstrate that trade in services can have a positive impact on development, and that Chile has 
been aware of this. Chile has made limited efforts to promote exports of services, as discussed above and has 
failed to promote this sector to diversify the export matrix. The reality is that, beyond the negotiation of free 
trade agreements, the efforts have been modest and very recent. In order to answer the question, interviews 
were carried out with a series of stakeholders from the public and private sectors, as well as international, 
academic and non-governmental organizations. The selection was based on their linkage and knowledge on 
the subject of services or productive development policies in Chile.  
 
The results obtained in this research arise from the analysis of the perception held by key stakeholders 
regarding the role that the State had in the development of the service industry after the return to democracy. 
This was done through the study of the public policies implemented, as well as the promotion programs for 
the services sector that did not materialize, in order to represent the instruments used, both from the 
knowledge of its general guidelines and from conceptualization that incorporated in its elaboration. The 
results of the interviews, allowed the identification of three overlapping levels, in a hierarchy ranging from 
macro problems to more technical and regulatory aspects 
 
In the first level we grouped the considerations on economic doctrines and business cultures. This point refers 
us to two reasons: on the one hand, the penetration of a neoliberal model with a conception of subsidiary State 
embedded in all levels of society. It is a State that has limitedly promoted the service industry as a 
consequence of the predominance of ideologies or political philosophies that privilege minimal State 
intervention. On the other hand, is the existence of an entrepreneurial class that has not had the strength or will 
to modify productive and export pattern. 
 
The second deals with considerations of specificity in the service industry and associated economic aspects. In 
the first instance, it is indisputable that in the short term services are less profitable with respect to the 
development of alternatives such as agricultural or mining industry. In a country whose policy perspective is 
closely related to electoral periods, it is complex to think of implementing strategies whose results would be 
noticeable over longer periods. 
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In addition to the above, there is a high ignorance of the services sector and its potentialities, particularly with 
respect to those of greater complexity, which explains, in some way, the low effort to support this sector. In 
turn, this lack of understanding can be explained by the following reasons: the recent irruption of services in 
the commercial world, their coexistence in a world designed and structured for goods, and the methodological 
difficulty in measuring them. 
  
Given the short-term vision and ignorance regarding the services sector, the situation is exacerbated by the 
lack of institutional coordination in Chile to address the issue. This absence has meant that the programs are 
dispersed, have divided resources and have little continuity. CORFO and ProChile do not have institutional 
structures of coordination and this one is based on the will of people and their good or bad personal relations 
with others. Likewise, there is a primacy of finance in the decisions of economic policy, under a marked 
vision of non-intervention in the productive processes. An example illustrates the latter aspect: although the 
private sector itself has identified the main obstacles in the SII and SNA, obstacles have not been removed. 
 
In this same level, is recognized as a disadvantage the Chilean remoteness and isolation and the small size of 
its market. In another aspect, the scarcity of skilled labour is diagnosed as one of the obstacles to the 
development of a sector that is intensive in human capital. Finally, a low impact of openness is identified, a 
process in which it was almost magically entrusted as an option for services to reach external markets, in 
addition to the absence of a public-private action system. Amongst economic considerations, the policy of no 
exchange rate intervention was another pillar of the model's severity, coupled with the volatility that has 
historically affected companies to reach third markets. The tax structure has also been an impediment, in 
particular due to double taxation.  
 
The last level reviews specific service-oriented policy, instrument and sectoral considerations. ProChile and 
CORFO are the object of deep criticism, which in many cases are linked to the foreground analysed, that is, 
those associated with economic doctrine and business culture. ProChile has an area dedicated to services with 
a very low budget - on average, one million dollars annually - and that arises only in 2006. Amongst these 
programs, the Cluster of Global Services was the most representative, but in conjunction with the rest of the 
initiatives has not managed to modify the panorama in a relevant way. This program ended with the change of 
government between President Michelle Bachelet and President Sebastián Piñera, and its end shows the short-
term policy design and the little capacity for self-criticism. 
 
Since the end of the field work, some new policies had been implemented in the country. In July 2015, the 
Public-Private Technical Committee was created. The mission is to identify, analyse and evaluate and analyse 
and evaluate the measures implementation that promote services exports, to ratify that they are feasible in the 
context of the regulations and norms and the budgetary restrictions. Chileservicios.com is a new electronic 
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platform containing all information needed related to service export, mechanisms of support and promotion, 
that helps exporters to export services. The National Customs Services has a new services classification valid 
from June 2016, to make easier to apply the benefits to service exporters, fundamental to implement other 
programs as the reimbursing the imported raw material in to services exports according to Law No 18708/88.  
 
The Committee of Ministers of the Economic Area, composed by the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of 
Economy, Development and Tourism, announced in March 2016 a package of 22 measures to boost 
productivity and increase the economic growth capacity. The initiatives were focused on three areas: financing 
of new initiatives, agenda for promotion and expand the definition of service to include them in the 0% VAT 
benefit when exporting. Recently, the vice minister of treasury, Alejandro Micco, acknowledges that if the 
country could not boost their exports on services it will impossible to have higher growth rates. “Chile should 
be in the services engine. This is what we expect” (Micco, 2016). The current Ministry of Treasury, Rodrigo 
Valdés, listed three commitments: create a public-private working group in services; revision of the regulatory 
and procedures in tax and customs aspects related to services exports; and to develop an analysis of the private 
or public financial mechanisms for the sector (Valdés, 2016). 
 
Finally, there are a number of recommendations that are presented below, which address aspects ranging from 
macro to micro: 
 
 It is recognized that the model has penetrated the different social strata and that the size of the State 
makes it impossible to generate aggressive industrial policies that can cause deep disagreements. For 
this reason, promoting and guiding small enterprises requires a lot of resources and it is more difficult 
to internationalize them, so it is possible to condition the aid to large companies with the condition 
that they work with the small ones. 
 The Government must create strategies and intervene. The debate is whether this should be done with 
vertical promotion policies or not. For some interviewees, with great guidelines would be sufficient 
and this would not have to attack the model. For others, the intervention should directly encourage the 
creation of new sectors or the development of services that contribute in the areas where there are 
comparative advantages, in the Chilean case of natural resources. If the State does not choose 
winners, sectors would not develop.  
 In order to move towards better models of services development policies, there is a need to raise 
greater ambitions. There must be a law that defines the modification of the basket as a priority and 
that determines a coordinated institutions, with the necessary resources. ProChile should be part of the 
Ministry of Economy and respond to an internal industry development plan, not only to demand. 
ProChile also needs to be empowered to eliminate some systemic failures, as well as to develop 
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business capacity and design international marketing strategies. Inter-agency coordination should be 
improved. 
 International certifications should be encouraged and disseminated so that service providers can 
understand and use them. 
 The financial sector must raise its understanding of services of greater complexity, so that there are 
incentives for entrepreneurship. 
 Public-private partnership is urgent for the country development, structured in such a way that there 
are shared risks and in areas of national interest. 
  Tourism services should be encouraged and a definition of the type of tourism that the country 
aspires to position in the world can be given, as well as a boost to the human capital needed to 
promote this activity. 
 
Finally, this paper proposes new topics for research with respect to those already established in the service 
literature: 
  
• How you establish development promotion policies with a long-term conception, as the alternative to 
be able to modify the country's export and production matrix? 
• Analyse each of the sectors with greater depth and relevance for the country. 
• Detect the country's regional opportunities and potential in services, as well as the effects of its 
integration into regional linkages in this area. 
• The study of possible public-private partnerships. 
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ANNEXES 
 
 
Annex I Chile’s Trade Agreements 
Country Agreement Type Entry into 
force  
Country Agreement Type Entry into 
force  
Australia Free Trade Agreement 6 March 2009 Japan 
Economic Association 
Agreement  
3  September 
2007 
Bolivia 
Economic 
Complementation 
Agreement 
6  April 1993 Malaysia Free Trade Agreement 
25 February 
2012 
Canada Free Trade Agreement 5 July 1997 
MERCOSUR 
(1) 
Economic 
Complementation 
Agreement 
1 October 
1996 
China Free Trade Agreement 
1 October 
2006 
Mexico Free Trade Agreement 31 July 1999 
Colombia Free Trade Agreement 8 May 2009 P4 (4) 
Economic Association 
Agreement 
8 November 
2006 
South Korea  Free Trade Agreement 2 April 2004 Panama Free Trade Agreement 7 March 2008 
Cuba 
Economic 
Complementation 
Agreement 
27  June  
2008 
Peru 
Economic 
Complementation 
Agreement 
1 March 2009 
Ecuador 
Economic 
Complementation 
Agreement 
25  January 
2010 
Turkey Free Trade Agreement 1 March 2011 
EFTA (3) Free Trade Agreement 
1 December 
2004 
European Union 
(2) 
Economic 
Complementation 
Agreement 
1 February 
2003 
United 
States 
Free Trade Agreement 
1  January  
2004 
Venezuela 
Economic 
Complementation 
Agreement 
1 July 1993 
Hong Kong 
SAR 
Free Trade Agreement 
9  October  
2014 
Central 
America (7) 
Free Trade Agreement 
14 February  
2002 
India Partial Agreement 
17 August  
2007 
Vietnam Free Trade Agreement 
1 January 
2014 
Pacific 
Alliance (6) 
Commercial Protocol 1 May 2016 Thailand Free Trade Agreement 
25 November 
2015 
 (1) Mercosur:  Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, Brazil and Uruguay. Chile participates as an associated 
country. 
 (2) European Union: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Rumania, Sweden. 
 (3) EFTA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.  
 (4) P4: Chile, New Zealand, Singapore y Brunei Darussalam. 
 (5) Transpacific Partnership: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, United States, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan. 
 (6) Pacific Alliance: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
 (7) Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua. 
 
Source: Direcon (2017) 
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Annex II Investment Promotion Protection Agreements (IPPAs) 
 
Agreement 
partners 
Subscription 
Date 
Entry into force 
Agreement 
partners 
Subscription 
Date 
Entry into 
force 
Germany 14 April 1997 17 November 2000 Iceland 26 June 2003 16 May 2006 
Argentina 02 August 1991 27 February 1995 Italia 08 March 1993 23 June 1995 
Australia 09 July 1996 18 November 1999 Lebanon 13 October 1999 n.d. 
Austria 
08 September 
1997 
18 June 1999 Malaysia 
11 November 
1992 
04 August 1995 
Belgium 15 July 1992 05 August 1999 Nicaragua 
08 November 
1996 
10 December 
2001 
Bolivia 
22 September 
1994 
21 July 1999 Norway 01 June 1993 
04 November 
1994 
Brazil 
22 March 1994 
24 November 
2015 
n.d. New Zealand 22 July 1999 n.d. 
China 23 March 1994 14 October 1995 Netherlands 
30 November 
1998 
n.d. 
Colombia 22 January 2000 n.d. Panama 
08 November 
1996 
21 December 
1999 
South Korea 
06 September 
1996 
18 November 1991 Paraguay 07 August 1995 
21 December 
1999 
Costa Rica 11 July 1996 08 July 2000 Peru 
02 February 
2000 
11 August 2001 
Croatia 
28 November 
1994 
31 July 1996 Poland 05 July 1995 
22 September 
2000 
Cuba 10 January 1996 30 September 2000 Portugal 28 April 1995 
22 September 
2000 
Denmark 28 May 1993 30 November 1995 United Kingdom 24 April 1995 23 June 1997 
Ecuador 27 October 1993 21 February 1996 Czech Republic 24 April 1995 
02 December 
1996 
Egypt 05 August 1999 n.d. 
Dominican 
Republic 
28 November 
2000 
n.d. 
El Salvador 
08 November 
1996 
18 November 1991 Romania 04 July 1995 27 August 1997 
Spain 02 October 1991 27 April 1994 South Africa 
12 November 
1998 
n.d. 
Philippines 
20 November 
1995 
06 November 1997 Sweden 24 May 1993 
13 February 
1996 
Finland 27 May 1993 14 June 1996 Switzerland 
24 September 
1999 
22 August 2002 
France 14 July 1992 05 December 1994 Tunisia 23 October 1998 n.d. 
Greece 10 July 1996 07 March 2003 Turkey 21 August 1998 n.d. 
Guatemala 
08 November 
1996 
10 December 2001 Ukraine 30 October 1995 29 August 1997 
Honduras 
11 November 
1996 
10 January 2002 Uruguay 25 March 2010 18 March 2012 
Hong Kong, China 
SAR 
18 November 
2016 
n.d. Venezuela 01 April 1993 17 May 1994 
Hungary 10 March 1997 n.d. Vietnam 
16 September 
1999 
n.d. 
Indonesia 07 April 1999 n.d.    
Source: UNCTAD (2017) 
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Annex III Sectoral Brands supported by ProChile in services. 
 
Sectoral Brands  
 
  
Partners: 21 Superior Education Institutions 
Year: 2014-current 
Market: China, Europa, United States and Brazil 
  
 
  
 Partners: Association of Film and Television 
Producers 
Year: 2009- current 
Market: Latin America, United States and 
Europe 
 
  
Partners: Gastronomic Association of Chile. 
Year: 2011 
 
Partners: Association of Offices of Architects 
-AOA  
Market: China-Latin American 
Year: 2009–2014 
 
Partners: Chilean Association of Biotechnology 
Companies 
Country: United States 
Year: 2010-current 
 
  
Partners: Association of Consulting 
Engineering Companies of Chile A.G. 
Country: Canada 
 
Partners: Chilean Association of Information 
Technology Companies 
Country: United States 
Year: 2010-current 
 
 Partners: Corporative Development 
Corporation of Capital Goods, Asexma Chile 
A.G .; Minnovex A.G. 
Market: The entire value chain of the item 
 
Partners: Wine Association of Chile  
Year: 2009- 
Market: United States of America 
 
 
Partners:  Association of Advertising Film 
Producers (APCP) 
Year: 2013- 
Market: United States and Europe 
Source: ProChile 
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Annex IV Main activities of the outsourcing services cluster 2008 -2009 
Scope Main results [2008-2009] 
International 
Promotion 
 Country promotion campaign on global services in the US market. 
 Public-private presence at major global service events in the US, Europe 
and India.  
 Project search: expert consulting for US and India markets.  
 Meetings 1 to 1: Visits to more than 80 of the leading multinational 
companies and service providers in the US, Europe and India. 
 Presence in international markets through the offices of InvestChile in 
New York, Los Angeles, Madrid and Delhi. 
Human Capital 
 Extension of the National Registry of CORFO English in more than 
41,000 people. 
 Implementation of the English Training Program for Professionals and 
Technicians of IT careers. 
 More than 3,000 scholarships awarded and coverage in all regional 
capitals. 
 Plan for the diffusion of technological careers and job opportunities 
offered by the sector, focused on young people of secondary education. 
 Line of credit for IT careers with CORFO guarantee, with availability for 
more than 1,500 credits for technical careers. 
 Execution of two labour fairs for IT professionals 
Local Industry 
Development 
 Internationalization of Chilean companies. ACTI Global Services Platform in 
the US. 
 Implementation of the 3 projects of Image Country in the following areas: 
Information Technologies (USA), Contemporary Chilean Architecture (Beijing, 
China) and Audio-visual Industry (USA and Europe). 
Regulations 
 Proposed Draft Law on the Protection of Personal Data 
 Qualification process of global services export centres 
 Facilitation of the visa process for ISG professionals. 
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Annex IV Double Taxation Agreements 
 
Country Entry in to force
  
Country Entry in to force  
Australia 2013 Mexico 1999 
Belgium 2010 Norway 2003 
Argentina 2016 China 2017 
Italy 2017 Japan 2016 
Brazil 2003 New Zealand 2006 
Canada 1999 Paraguay 2008 
Colombia 2009 Peru 2003 
South Korea 2003 Poland 2003 
Croatia 2004 Portugal 2008 
Denmark 2004 United Kingdom 2004 
Ecuador 2003 Russia 2012 
Spain 2003 Sweden 2005 
France 2006 Switzerland 2010 
Ireland 2008 Thailand 2010 
Malaysia 2008 South Africa 2016 
Czech Republic 2012 Austria 2012 
Source: SII (2017) 
   
 
 
